Thereareexceptions,,www.youxs.org”ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy(April,1950),isreluctanttoacceptthe,ChineseFarmEconomy(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930);,”FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,”FoodResearchInstituteStudies(1963).Weshalldiscussthisinchapter3.
[2].InthePhilippines,forexample,therentalsharerestrictionwasca,”PhilippineLandReform,1950-1958,”InternationalCooperationAdministration,USOMIPhilippines(Manila,1958).
www.youxs.org
Thedefinitionofala”landreform”hdistributionorresourceallocation.
InTaiwan,forexample,themuchpublicizedfarmlandreformdidnotspringupatonetime:itwastheproductofaserieso,,thecrucialarticlesofwhichwillbediscussedinthenextsection,,atotalofover350articleswereappendedtodefinetheTaiwanlandreform.[1]Despiteitsplexity,wemaygenerallydividethereformintothreephases.
Thefirstphaseinvolvedarentlimitationprogram,,,promulgatedandenforcedinTaiwanfromApril14,1949.[2]Thesecondsetincludesthirty-onearticles,promulgatedonJune7,1951,andintendedtogointoeffectinFebruary1952.[3]Whiletheprovisionsofbothwillbeexaminedinlaterchapters,itistheeconomicimplicationsofthefirstsetuponwhichIshallconcentrate,forIcouldfindnoevidencethatthesecondsetwasactuallyenforced.
Thesecondphaseofthelandreformpertainstothesaleofpubliclandstoestablishowner-farmers.[4]Thisprogram,promulgatedinJune1951andcarriedoutfromJuly1951toJune1953,coveredaportiono[5]Thethirdphaseisthemos”Land-to-the-TillerAct,”,landholdingsofaprivatelandowhelandbeingpurchased,paidbytenumericalprices,,transfersoflandrightsamongindividualswereprohibited.[6]NeitherthesecondnorthethirdphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformwillbecoveredinthisstudy.
Despitethefactthatthereformprovisionsareseveralandvaried,thecontractto”protect”:
fulnessandlandownershiphadbeeanobstacletofurtherdevelopmentofagricultureaswellasindustry……Withthelimitedfarmlandandtheirrationaltenuresystem,ruralunderemploymentpresentedaseriousproblem.[7]
Asecondjustificationofferedisthatfarmingundertenancy,andsharetenancyinparticular,iseconomicallyinefficientonthreecounts.[8](1)(2)Thetenantsincentivetofarmwasdiscouragedbyasharecontract,sincepartofeveryunitofoutputproducedwouldgotothelandownerasrent.(3)And,sincetherentalscollectedbylandownerswereexorbitantlyhigh,thetenantslackedtheabilitytoinvest.
Athirdjustif,asharecontract,theyclaimed,,theevidencetheycitetosupportthe”exploitation”argumentisperhapscontradictorytotheirclaimofinefficienttenancy:forexample,landownersfrequentlystipulatedthattheirtenantsprovideseedsandfertilizers,andrequiredthattheyworkhard.[9]